Constitutional Law -- Right of Counsel -- State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Escobedo by Faulk, William H., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 44 | Number 1 Article 17
12-1-1965
Constitutional Law -- Right of Counsel -- State and
Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Escobedo
William H. Faulk Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William H. Faulk Jr., Constitutional Law -- Right of Counsel -- State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Escobedo, 44 N.C. L. Rev.
161 (1965).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol44/iss1/17
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ducted where the original proceedings were held, the burden of the
numerous petitions for such relief is more evenly spread among the
superior courts throughout the state, since the courts located near
prisons may no longer be overburdened with habeas corpus petitions.
WILLIAM L. STOCKS
Constitutional Law-Right of Counsel-State and Lower Federal
Court Interpretations of Escobedo
The historic Supreme Court decision of Escobedo v. Illinois,1
which extended the right to counsel to some point prior in time to
the actual trial of an accused,' has engendered a wealth of theoretical
discussion of the problems it encompassed.3 The state and lower
federal courts have had to face many of these problems on a prac-
tical rather than theoretical plane. The following categories con-
stitute some of the most critical areas that have required interpre-
tation.
I. FAILURE TO INFORM THE ACCUSED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND THE ABSENCE OF A REQUEST FOR COUNSEL
In situations where an accused was not advised of his right to
counsel or to remain silent in the accusatory stage of an investiga-
'378 U.S. 478 (1964).2 The defendant Escobedo was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to police
headquarters for interrogation concerning the murder of his brother-in-law.
A lawyer, previously retained, made two futile attempts to see Escobedo
at headquarters. During the interrogation the defendant was confronted
with a statement solicited from another suspect accusing him of the crime.
Without the benefit of his attorney's advice, the defendant made incriminat-
ing statements in response to this accusation that lead to his subsequent
conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded stating:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody,
the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and
been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of
Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as
"made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,"
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 342, and that no statement elicited
by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial.
Id. at 490-91.
' See, e.g., Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United
States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964); Note, 43
N.C.L. Rav. 187 (1964).
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tion,4 a prevalent method of avoiding direct confrontation with the
Escobedo dilemma has been to distinguish Escobedo on the basis
of a particular aspect of the Supreme Court decision that was absent
from the situation facing the lower court.5 The fact situation of
Escobedo had many facets, and courts taking this approach have
not found the task of containing its ruling particularly troublesome.
In State v. Howard6 the Missouri court upheld the conviction
of a defendant who had not been advised of his right to counsel
prior to making incriminating statements that were used against
him. The court held that since the defendant had not been pre-
vented from seeing a lawyer previously retained (as had defendant
Escobedo) Escobedo was not applicable.
The Illinois court in upholding the conviction of a defendant
who had not been advised of his rights before making incriminating
statements, confronted the issue on the basis of the voluntariness
of the confession rendered. 7 The court stated that "we do not,
however, read the Escobedo case as requiring the rejection of a
voluntary confession because the State did not affirmatively cau-
tion the accused of his right to have an attorney and his right to
remain silent before his admissions of guilt."'8 This rationale was
also employed by the North Carolina court9 in upholding the con-
viction of a defendant who had made incriminating statements to
an officer after being advised of his right to remain silent but not of
his right to counsel. The court concluded that Escobedo had no
effect on "free and voluntary conversation."'"
A contrary view is exemplified in People v. Stewart" where the
California Supreme Court, showing a tendency to apply Escobedo
liberally, held that once the investigatory process had reached the
stage where the right of counsel would attach, "the record must
' The accusatory stage is descriptive of the time when the investigation
has ,begun to "focus" on the suspect as described in note 2 supra.
See, e.g., State v. Worley, 178 Neb. 232, 132 N.W.2d 764 (1965);
Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965); State v. Darst, 399 P.2d 618(Wash. 1965).
'383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964).
People v. Hartgraves, 31 I11. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964).
'Ild. at -, 202 N.E.2d at 36.State v. Fletcher, 264 N.C. 482, 141 S.E.2d 873 (1965).
10 Id. at 485, 141 S.E.2d at 875.
1143 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97 (1965).
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indicate that the defendant was advised of his right to counsel and
to remain silent or that he knew of these rights and intelligently
and knowingly waived them."'
The California court again showed its liberal inclination in
People v. Dorado."3 It was held that once the stage is set for the
right of counsel to attach, the accused does not specifically have to
request legal assistance in order to make incriminating statements
elicited by the police during an accusatory investigation inadmis-
sible.14 The court did not concern itself with the voluntariness of
a confession obtained under such circumstances, but felt that the
right of counsel overrides such a consideration, even in the absence
of any evidence of coercion.
Courts opposing this interpretation have concerned themselves
with the absence of a specific request for counsel as well as the
voluntariness of the confessions obtained.15 In Sturgis v. State6
a defendant had confessed after being confined for four days without
a hearing or the services of an attorney. The Maryland court, re-
fusing to apply Escobedo, found no evidence of mistreatment of
the accused or that his confession was in any way the product of
coercion. In addition the court found neither a request for counsel
by the accused nor a denial of such on the part of the police. In the
absence of these elements, the court was convinced that the de-
fendant's confession was voluntary and therefore admissible.
The Pennsylvania court interjected the theory of unreasonable
curtailment of police investigatory methods into its approach to
the problem. In Commonwealth v. Maroney17 the police found the
defendant Maroney wounded at the feet of a murder victim. He
was immediately taken to the hospital for an emergency operation
and interrogated later the same morning. At this time the accused
1 2 Id. at 207, 400 P.2d at 103.
1842 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965).
1, For courts following this interpretation, see, e.g., United States v.
Myers, 240 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Galarza Cruz v. Delgado, 233
F. Supp. 944 (D.P.R. 1964); State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1965).
" See, e.g., United States v. Ogilivie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964);
Woodard v. State, 171 So. 2d 462 (Ala. Ct. App. 1965); State v. Worley,
178 Neb. 232, 132 N.W.2d 764 (1965) ; State v. Darst, 399 P.2d 618 (Wash.
1965); State v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).
'5 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d 681 (1964).
'"416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965).
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was informed that anything he said could be used against him. He
was not offered, nor did he request, the services of counsel. He
proceeded to describe the murder and four days later signed a type-
written statement of the same. In holding the confession admissible
the court said:
To hold now that his description of the event at that time is
inadmissible, because he did not have counsel or waive his right
thereto beforehand, is tantamount to precluding the police from
ever interrogating individuals suspected of crime, and could
result in barring from evidence all admissions obtained in the
course thereof."
Though not discussing law enforcement expediency, the Fourth
Circuit took a dim view of the defendant's failure to request counsel
in Davis v. North Carolina."0 The defendant, an escapee from a state
prison, was taken into custody by the police and kept in jail a total
of sixteen days until he confessed to the crime of murder.20 In
upholding the admission of the confession, the court refused to
apply Escobedo on the basis that the defendant had, according to
police testimony, been informed of his rights and had not requested
the assistance of counsel. The police arrest sheet, however, clearly
indicated that Davis was to be held without the privileges of using
a telephone or seeing anyone. It was established that the police had
aided Davis in contacting his sister, the only person he had requested
to see. The dissenting opinion, agreeing with the Dorado interpreta-
tion of Escobedo,2" pointed out that it would have been useless for
the defendant to request an attorney when the arrest sheet indicated
that such a request would have been rejected.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals22 coupled the lack of a
request for counsel with the fact that the accused had been advised
of her constitutional right of silence in declaring an incriminating
statement admissible. The court evidently felt that an affirmative re-
quest and denial of counsel was necessary to bring Escobedo into
play once the warning against self-incrimination was given.
81d. at -, 206 A.2d at 290-91.
18339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964).
'
0 The prison warden had granted the officers permission to detain the
accused instead of returning him to the state prison.
* See text accompanying note 13 supra.
"Miller v. State, 387 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
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II. THE NECESSITY OF THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF AN
ATTORNEY AT THE INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED
Courts have been reluctant to hold that the mere physical ab-
sence of an attorney, at the time the accused was interrogated, is
sufficient to render a confession inadmissible under Escobedo3
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Long v. United
States24 declared that no court or legislative body has held that
statements made voluntarily to the police are inadmissible regardless
of the circumstances. The Washington Supreme Court used the
same reasoning25 in holding that a confession obtained in the ab-
sence of counsel was not "per se inadmissible."2 In that case de-
fendant had confessed after being warned by his attorney (who
was not present at the time of the confession) against making any
statements to the police.
The same District of Columbia court that rendered the Long 7
decision, was faced with a somewhat different situation in Queen
v. United States. 28 There they considered the absence of counsel at
the time of confession to be critical. The defendant had been advised
of her right of silence and was granted a continuance for the pur-
pose of obtaining counsel. She was interrogated during this con-
tinuance, at which time she made incriminating statements that
were subsequently used against her. The court refused to uphold the
admission of the statements recognizing that the untimely interro-
gation had frustrated the defendant's right of counsel.
III. THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENCE OF ALL OF THE ELEMENTS
IN Escobedo To BRING A CASE WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF ITS RULING
The cases previously discussed would seem to indicate that
Escobedo is often distinguished on the basis of a particular element
"E.g, Watson v. Gaughan, 338 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1964); Jackson v.
United States, 337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Hayes v. United States, 236
F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mo. 1964); Davidson v. United States, 236 F. Supp.
264 (W.D. Okla. 1964); Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ark.
1964); Hayden v. State, 201 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. 1964); State v. Fox, 131
N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387, 207 N.E.2d
356, 259 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1965); Sturgis v. State, 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d
681 (1964); Marion v. State, 387 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).24338 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
" State v. Young, 400 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1965).
0Id. at 375.
"Note 24 supra.
28335 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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of the decision that is somewhat different from the case under con-
sideration. However, some courts have ventured further and pro-
fessed an intention to apply Escobedo only in situations where the
various conditions that prompted the Supreme Court opinion itself
were present.20 For example, the Delaware court30 stated that
several factors seem to be necessary for the Escobedo rule to apply
and a case must be considered in the light of the facts that were
before the Supreme Court."' The Wisconsin court, in State v.
Burke,3 2 expressed the feeling that the most Escobedo did was
to say that failure to inform a criminal suspect under arrest of
his constitutional right against self-incrimination, coupled with other
circumstances, may be enough to exclude any confession made by
him.
Without being overly concerned with the boundaries of Escobedo,
courts not wishing to limit the decision to its facts have applied the
principle of pre-trial right of counsel to a variety of case situations.'a
A notable example is the District of Columbia case in which the
committing magistrate had appointed counsel for the defendant,3'
but the attorney was not informed when his client was called before
the grand jury and repeated former confessions. The court held
that such failure to inform the attorney was ground for reversal
since the defendant would have refrained from the additional in-
crimination with his counselor's advice.
IV. THE INGREDIENTS OF AN "INTELLIGENT WAIVER"
OF THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL
In situations where a court is convinced that the circumstances
necessary for the right of counsel to attach were present, the de-
"0 E.g., Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1964); Cephus v.
United States, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2674 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 1965). United
States v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. III. 1965); Davidson v. United
States, 236 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Okla. 1964); State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684(Iowa 1964); Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d 16 (Mass. 1965); State
v. Howard, 383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964); Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev.
1965); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965).
':King v. Delaware, 212 A.2d 722 (Del. 1965).
', The Delaware court placed a further limitation on Escobedo by saying
that it was not applicable to pre-arrest situations.
27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).
"See cases discussed in previous categories.
"Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 44
NOTES AND COMMENTS
cisions have presented a broad spectrum of interpretation as to what
constitutes a waiver of this right.35
Criminal technique was evidently a major consideration in the
Kentucky case of Scamahorne v. Commonwealth"6 where the court
concluded that since the defendants were intelligent enough to park
a car a mile from the scene of the crime; carry tools to get into the
back of the building; crawl across a field to avoid detection; hide
when the police approached; and come out with their hands up
asking not to be shot, they must surely have the intelligence to be
aware of their right to counsel. The defendants did not request an
attorney; therefore the court concluded that they had waived their
rights to do so.
The Third Circuit in Russo v. New Jersey,3 without delving
into the mechanics of the crime as a criterion for intelligence,
held that the failure to request counsel at the interrogation level
did not in itself constitute a waiver of the right. The Oregon
court in State v. Neely3s held that to be sure that an accused
knew of his right to counsel, steps must be taken to insure that he
is effectively informed. The court held that there could be no
waiver of the right if there was any doubt that the accused was
aware of it. The burden of defendant enlightenment, under this
rationale, falls squarely on the shoulders of the law enforcement
officers.
Age and experience have received consideration by some courts.
The Indiana courte9 allowed the admission of the signed incriminat-
ing statement of an accused of "tender years"40 who had been twice
advised of his right to counsel prior to the taking of the statement
and had failed to request legal aid. The court held that he had
"5E.g., Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1965); Miller v.
Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 338 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Pate, 240 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Richards v. Holman, 239 F. Supp.
137 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Ledbetter v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 239 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1965); People v. Stewart, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d
97 (1965); People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965);
Commonwealth v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965); Marion v.
State, 387 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); State v. Darst, 399 P.2d
618 (Wash. 1965).
"394 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1965).
" 33 U.S.L. WEEI 2621 (3d Cir. May 20, 1965).
" 395 P.2d 557 (Ore. 1964).
" Hayden v. State, 201 N.E2d 329 (Ind. 1964).
"° Id. at 329.
1965]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
effectively waived his right of counsel despite his age, as he was
"worldly wise far beyond his years. "41
The Fifth Circuit declined to comment on the issue of unequivocal
waiver (as exemplified in the Indiana case where the defendant was
both advised of his right to counsel and failed to request aid), but
allowed the age and experience of the defendant to weigh heavily
in his favor.' The accused was nineteen years old and had been
confined for two months at the time of his confession. Counsel
had been appointed, and the attorney had warned him against making
any statements to federal officers. The attorney was absent from
the interrogation in question, the defendant having neglected to
request his presence. The interrogating officers were unaware that
the defendant was even represented by counsel. In declaring the
confession inadmissible, the court suggested that the officers could
have easily determined from the record that the defendant had been
provided with an attorney, and because of the defendant's youth
and inexperience they had a duty to do so. The court extended
this duty by declaring that if officers discovered that the defendant
was represented by counsel, they must ascertain if the accused desired
his presence at the interview.'
V. THE PROBLEM OF RETROACTIVITY
Courts that have held that Escobedo is to be given retroactive
application have done so without a great deal of fanfare.44 The
Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Fogliani,45 for example,
merely said that Escobedo should without a doubt be retroactive
along with Gideon v. Wainwright.4"
Courts opposing retroactive application 47 have concerned them-
selves with an analysis of the purpose of the Escobedo decision-
'
1 Id. at 330.
"Clifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1965).
,The Fifth Circuit made reference to the age and experience factor
in Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965). The court distin-
guished Escobedo on several grounds, one being that the defendant had
previous convictions while Escobedo was twenty-two years old and of Mexi-
can extraction.
"See, e.g., Fugate v. Ellenson, 237 F. Supp. 44 (D. Neb. 1964).
"343 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965).
48372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1964).
47 E.g., United States v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ill. 1965) ; Hayes
v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mo. 1964); King v. Delaware,
212 A.2d 722 (Del. 1965); State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737
(1965).
(Vol. 44
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i.e., what was the true nature of the injustice it sought to cor-
rect, and would this correction be served by retroactivity.
In the case of In re Lopez,48 the California court declined retro-
active application on the ground that the true purpose of Escobedo
was to curtail future police practices that might lead to involuntary
confessions. The court did not deny that such practices were un-
healthy in the past, but felt that they had not necessarily resulted
in a "substantial risk"4 to the rights of an individual who had
voluntarily confessed. As to confessions that might have been
coerced from defendants in the past, the court expressed the hope
that such injustice had been uncovered at the trial."°
In addition to discounting retroactivity on the basis of its re-
lationship to the truth or falsity of a confession, the California
court referred to placing of "impossible burdens upon the ad-
ministration of criminal justice"5'1 that such a ruling would create.
The court felt that viewing long-forgotten cases would obviously
involve the rehashing of hazy fact situations and the time-dulled
memory of past witnesses.
The same rationale was evidenced in the Seventh Circuit's re-
fusal to apply Escobedo to the past. In Walden v. Pate12 the court
stated
Nothing expressed in either the Mapp 53 or Escobedo opinion
required retrospective application of the rule announced ....
a condition existed where ignorance of constitutional rights
and absence of counsel operated to the prejudice of persons in
custody. In order to put an end to a system so fraught with po-
tential abuses, the Supreme Court in Escobedo decided to re-
move the incentive to deny an accused the right to counsel by
rendering inadmissible any confession obtained while such de-
nial was in effect.54
4842 Cal. Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380 (1965).
,Id. at 194, 398 P.2d at 386.It is interesting to note that the Lopez decision was delivered the
same day as People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965). See
text accompanying note 13 supra.
In re Lopez, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 198, 398 P.2d at 390.52350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965).83Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court held that any evidence
obtained during the course of an illegal search and seizure would be in-
admissible against the accused.
"' Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 342-43 (7th Cir. 1965). If Escobedo is truly
analogous to Mapp, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning may well become the
law of the land. The Supreme Court declared that Mapp will not be given
retroactive application in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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VI. "TRIAL TACTICS" AND THE APPEAL OF A DEFENDANT WHOSE
ATTORNEY DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF DEPRIVATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE TRIAL COURT
When the question of the denial of the right of counsel during
the pre-trial stage arises for the first time on appeal, the possibility
of a waiver of such rights takes on a new aspect. In addition to a
consideration of the facts surrounding the alleged constitutional
violation, the court must determine whether or not the defendant's
attorney has closed the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court.55
Hence the defendant is faced with two possible adversaries to his
fundamental rights, i.e. his own lawyer, as well as the individuals
who have allegedly violated his right to counsel.
In Timmons v. Peyton56 the Virginia district court was of the
opinion that mistakes in judgment or trial tactics of the defendant's
counsel do not deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights and
cannot be reviewed on a writ of habeas corpus. The Ninth Circuit
did not completely close the door to review, 57 but did hold that where
the question was not raised in the district court, it could not be heard
on appeal unless a failure to do so would constitute a "manifest
miscarriage"5' 8 of justice.
The Nevada Supreme Court discussed this problem in Bean v.
State.5" The court held that the defendant had not been deprived
of his rights at the pre-trial level, but indicated that if this had been
the case, the failure of his attorney to object to the confessions
obtained thereby would throw a different light on the subject. The
defendant had pleaded insanity in the original trial, and the court
" The issue was confronted by the Supreme Court in Henry v. Missis-
sippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). The attorney had failed to object to the intro-
duction of illegally seized evidence at the trial, and the defendant was sub-
sequently convicted. The question raised was whether the attorney had
thereby waived the defendant's right by knowingly bypassing his remedy
in the lower court. The Supreme Court, remanding for further State con-
sideration of the significance of procedural defects, warned that a dismissal
of the case on the basis of adequate state grounds would not end the litigation:
IP]etitioner might still pursue vindication of his federal claim in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding in which the procedural default will
not alone preclude consideration of his claim, at least unless it is shown
that petitioner deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state
courts.
Id. at 452.
"240 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Va. 1965).
' Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1965).
"OId. at 986.
"398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965).
[Vol. 44
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was aware that his attorney may have wanted the jury to consider
the confessions as evidence of a deranged mind.
Contrary to the rationale in the aforementioned cases, the de-
fendants have not always found themselves stymied by the actions
of their attorneys in the trial courts. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court ruled that the defendants confession was inadmissible on the
basis of Escobedo, even though the issue was not raised at the trial.'
The court's ruling was based on the fact that there was no evidence
that the defendant had acquiesed in his attorney's decision not to
object to the introduction of the incriminating statements, and
therefore he had waived no rights.
The relationship of the time lapse between the defendant's orig-
inal trial and the Escobedo decision was a major factor in the de-
fendant's favor in Ledbetter v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary.,1 The
defendant had made both oral and written confessions that were
introduced at the trial level without objection. The court concluded
that the confessions, which were the only evidence of the defendant's
guilt, were obtained in violation of the principles laid down in
Escobedo. As the Escobedo case had not been decided at the time
of the trial in question, the failure of the attorney to object would
not constitute a waiver of the defendant's rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The categories discussed above illustrate the extent to which the
web of implications surrounding Escobedo has developed. In all
likelihood no single Supreme Court decision will eliminate this
confusion. There seems to be no definite line of division between
the various lower court approaches to a given problem that will
allow opposing viewpoints to be neatly classified. For example, the
attitudes toward waiver are particularly inconsistent. Not only do
courts vary in their interpretation of the circumstantial prerequi-
sites for a valid waiver, but the background of the individual ac-
cused may be a critical consideration. A defendant who has ex-
perienced previous criminal proceedings may find it hard to persuade
a court that he was unaware of his constitutional rights.
One reason for this diversity of interpretation is that funda-
mental methods of law enforcement procedure are at stake in the
"0 State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1965).
1239 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1965).
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application of Escobedo. A liberal approach requires an adjustment
by police and courts alike. A liberal interpretation of Escobedo re-
quires the investigating officer to determine, at that time, if the
person questioned is an accused, or face the possibility of a volun-
tary confession's being excluded. This quasi-judicial determination
may well affect the outcome of subsequent litigation. Even though
the officer makes such a determination, there is no certainty that
the court will concur in his finding. If the accused's request for
counsel is required, the interrogator is able to proceed with some
degree of certainty, and the court is spared from confrontation with
Escobedo in such a situation where only hindsight can establish
its applicability.
The relationship of Escobedo to the guilt or innocence of an ac-
cused is another consideration that might persuade a court to limit
the Supreme Court ruling. It is conceivable that a guilty defendant
might find Escobedo a valuable tool with which to prolong litigation
of his case in a jurisdiction that gives it a broad application. In
such instances, invoking Escobedo might not affect the final outcome
of the trial but would hamper the ability of the court to administer
justice within a reasonable time.
A further consideration that has caused apprehension among
lower courts is that a liberal application of Escobedo would result
in an unreasonable burden on police ability to investigate crime.62
The majority opinion in Escobedo suggested that a law enforce-
ment system built on confessions would be less reliable in the long
run than one built on independently secured evidence through in-
vestigation.03 It has been suggested, however, that if it is necessary
for an attorney to be present at an interrogation, the result would
be a suppression rather than a disclosure of evidence. 4 It is sub-
mitted that the suppression of evidence is not the goal of any legiti-
mate law enforcement system.
It has been suggested that a possible solution to these conflicts
would be to require that interrogations be conducted in the presence
of witnesses at places controlled by the police." Requiring recording
of the interviews would be a further deterrent to coercive police
methods66
€' See text accompanying note 18 supra.
°' Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
e' Enker & Elsen, op. cit. supra note 3.00Id. at 85.
T Ibid.
[Vol. 44
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If a solution is achieved in addition to the problems that now fre-
quent the courts, however, there are others that may become signifi-
cant in the future. For example, does a collateral attack on a crim-
inal judgment become merely a civil proceeding in which the sixth
amendment does not apply? This expanding involvement of Esco-
bedo into other areas of criminal litigation points to the need for
a more definite enunciation of its limitations. it would seem de-
sirable for courts to be required to consider such a fundamental
right with some degree of uniformity.
WILLIAm H. FAULK, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation
Made Obligatory in State Prosecutions
[T]he privilege to confront one's accusers and cross-examine
them face to face is assured to a defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment in prosecutions in the federal courts, and in prosecutions in
the state courts is assured very often by the constitutions of the
states. For present purposes we assume that the privilege is
reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment, though this has not
been squarely held.'
So wrote Mr. Justice Cardozo some thirty-one years ago. But it
was not until 1965, in the cases of Pointer v. Texas2 and Douglas v.
Alabama, that this assumption was squarely affirmed.
In Pointer defendant was accused of robbery, and at a prelim-
inary hearing the victim testified, giving a detailed account of the
crime and identifying Pointer as its perpetrator. Neither Pointer
nor Dillard, an alleged accomplice, were represented by counsel at
the hearing, but Dillard tried to cross-examine the victim, and
Pointer was said to have attempted cross-examination of some of
the other witnesses.4 At Pointer's trial, because the robbery victim
had moved permanently out of the jurisdiction, the state offered
as evidence a transcript of this witness's prior testimony. Pointer's
counsel objected, arguing that the right to confrontation had been
denied at the hearing. The objection was overruled because Pointer
had been "accorded the opportunity of cross examining the wit-
' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934). (Emphasis added.)
2380 U.S. 400 (1965).
-380 U.S. 415 (1965).
'380 U.S. at 401.
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